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Recent reforms of agricultural policies in developed countries introduced direct payments to 
the detriment of traditional production enhancing instruments. Whereas these new instruments 
can influence production through several effects, current empirical studies do not show any 
significant impact on production; direct payments mainly increase land values. In this article, 
we revisit the evaluation of the coupling effects passing through the wealth of agricultural 
households.  The  initial  wealth  of  these  agents,  while  being  mainly  in  form  of  land  asset 
holding, is always assumed to be fixed. On the contrary we show theoretically and empirically 
that,  once  the  impact  of  farm  programs  on  initial  wealth  is  properly  accounted  for,  the 
measure of the coupling effects is considerably increased for direct payments and more much 
marginally for traditional policy instruments. We illustrate the impact of this initial wealth 
actualisation through a simulation of the suppression of the US corn policy. The impact of this 
policy was underestimated by two thirds.  
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Introduction 
Agricultural  policies  of  the  European  Union  (EU)  and  the  United  States  (US)  have  been 
considerably reformed over the last twenty years with the introduction of direct payments 
independent  of  production  volumes  to  the  detriment  of  traditional  production  enhancing 
instruments.  The  so-called  decoupling  process  really  started  in  1985  in  the  US  with  the 
introduction of deficiency payments on arable crops based on historical yields. In the EU the 
McSharry’s reform of 1992 also introduced direct subsidies independent of current yields to 
offset  the  drop  of  price  support.  This  process  is  still  operating  in  the  recent  Common 
Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  reforms  and  has  been  motivated  by  internal  efficiency 
considerations (better economic efficiency in the agricultural income support) as well as by 
external pressures in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) format  (less distortionary effects 
on exchanges).  
These  reforms  of  farm  policies  in  developed  countries  have  generated  a  huge  economic 
literature  trying  to  evaluate  their  effects.  Many  methodological  frameworks  have  been 
developed to identify the proper effects of these direct payments on the productions, i.e. their 
coupling effects. In theory several micro-economic mechanisms establish a link between these 
direct payments and the farm production. They indeed modify i) the agricultural labour by 
modifying  the  labour/leisure  arbitrage  of  farm  household  (Benjamin  1992);  ii)  the  capital 
invested  in  agriculture  by  relaxing  the  potential  constraints  on  credit  market  (Phimister 
1995) ; iii) the number of farms by covering their fixed costs (Chau and de Gorter 2005); iv) 
the wealth of farmers and thus the incentive to produce for risk averse farmers (Hennessy 
1998), v) the real wages and the employment level in different sectors through a general   3 
equilibrium  effect  linked  to  the  public  funding  of  these  payments  (Chambers  1995). 
Moreover,  some  eligibility  criterions  necessarily  go  with  the  definition  of  these  direct 
payments (base area in the US, number of single farm payment and conditionality in Europe, 
land use restrictions in both countries). These definition criterions may as well create a link 
between  payments  and  production  (Bhaskar  and  Beghin  2007a  for  base  area  in  the  US, 
Courleux  et  al.  2007  for  the  number  of  European  single  farm  payments).  Finally,  direct 
payments  can  theoretically  modify  the  agricultural  production  through  their  technical 
efficiency provided that this efficiency depends on the input levels and also that one of the 
above mechanisms applies. For instance Serra et al. (2007) consider the case where direct 
payments have a wealth effect on risk averse producers leading them to increase their input 
use, which in turn has an impact on their technical efficiency.  
From  an  empirical  point  of  view,  the  current  literature  tends  to  show  that  the  effects  on 
production quantities of these direct payments are low. Their main effect is to increase the 
value of land for purchase/sale or rent (Bhaskar and Beghin 2007b). However this interim 
synthesis is based upon sometimes quite a limited number of empirical studies. The most 
consequent literature concerns the measurement of the effects of direct payments through the 
wealth effect of risk averse farmers. 
1 All these studies consensually show that direct payments have a low effect on productions 
simply because they have small impact on the wealth of farmers. In that case, the degree of 
risk aversion of these farmers (and the wealth elasticity of production) does not matter a lot.   
The main idea advanced in this article is that all these studies underestimate the effect of 
direct payments on the wealth of farmers who own the factors (land) on which these payments 
are defined.
2 In fact the observed wealth of a farm household depends, among others, on the 
benefits that are expected from farming. The future direct payments are part of these expected 
benefits. So it must be taken into account that the wealth of a farm household, observed at a 
given  time,  depends  among  others  on  the  expectations  of  different  actors  concerning  the 
durability of direct payments. This implies that the initial wealth should not be considered as 
fixed as this is currently done in econometric analysis or in simulation models. In other words, 
our idea is that one must also modify the initial wealth of a risk averse farm household when 
identifying the decoupling of farm programs in general and of direct payments in particular. 
This new effect obviously depends on the structure of farm households’ wealth. In particular 
this effect is null if the farm household does not own farmland at all, which is the usual factor 
capturing the direct payments in the long run. In such case, benefits of farm programs are 
completely passed to the landowners. On the contrary, if the farm household partly owns 
farmland, then he will capture part of the benefits of farm programs. In that case, this farm 
household will be better off, will become less risk averse if his risk aversion is decreasing 
with wealth and finally will produce more.  
By explaining the initial wealth of a farm household, we simultaneously pay attention to the 
final beneficiary of direct payments. Available analyses with risk averse producers generally 
focus on the production impacts of direct payments without measuring their impacts on land 
values and farm household welfare.  In these analyses, direct payments  are represented as 
lump sump payments in the producer optimisation program and thus they do not translate into 
increased land values for instance. This is readily apparent in the analysis of Mullen et al. 
(2001) where the impacts on land values are reported. Their simulations show that the US 
landowner welfare increases much more with the coupled loan deficiency payments than with 
the more costly US direct payments. On the contrary we clearly identify in this article the 
landowner rather than the farm producer as the final beneficiary of direct payments. Our 
analysis will thus comply with the well known fact that farm programs finally end up in 
increased land values (Bhaskar and Beghin 2007b).     4 
In  this  article  we  first  theoretically  demonstrate  the  impact  that  the  explanation  of  farm 
household wealth has on the incidence of the farm programs on farm production and land 
values. We consider two farm programs: a traditional output subsidy which increases the 
average output price and a direct payment defined over historical yield and acreage. Then we 
develop a simulation model applied to a representative US corn farm to measure how this 
empirically modifies the impacts of these instruments.   
The article is organised as follows. In a first section we derive the microeconomic behaviour 
of a risk averse farm household using a standard framework suitable for our objective (static, 
mono product, one source of risk only, perfect credit, land and labour markets). In this first 
section, we assume that the initial wealth of this farm household is fixed and he is able to keep 
the benefit of direct payments. In a second section we simultaneously explicit the formation of 
farm  household’s  wealth  and  identify  the  ultimate  beneficiary  of  direct  payments.  The 
production and land value impacts of both programs are still compared on an equal budgetary 
cost basis. In a third section we calibrate an empirical model applied to a representative US 
corn farm. In a fourth section we conduct illustrative simulations to underline the impacts of 
our  modelling  modifications.  These  first  illustrative  simulations  are  followed,  in  a  fifth 
section, by a simulation of the effects of the US corn policy applied in 2001. Section six 
concludes by suggesting new directions of research for the analysis of the impacts of farm 
programs.  
 
1. The standard starting point with fixed initial wealth and lump sum direct payments 
1.  The assumptions 
We consider a simple framework of a farm household using his fixed human capital (L) and 
two variable inputs: land (T ) and an aggregate including the other inputs (I ) to produce one 
good (Y ). The two variable inputs are combined in the production technology with a CES 
(Constant Elasticity of Substitution) function and decreasing returns to scale (due to fixed 
human capital). The farm household receives a direct payment ( ) DP independent from his 
current activity. He faces just one source of risk: the price of his production ( Y P ) which 
expectation is 
Y P m and standard deviation is
Y P s . We also assume that this farm household is 
risk averse and that his preferences are represented by a power utility function.  Finally we 
assume in this section that his initial wealth ( 0 W ) is fixed. 
All these assumptions pertain to the individual farm household and will define the optimal 
production and input demands given the market price of inputs and output. To this framework 
we add a land supply function, so that we will be able to identify the impacts on land rental 
rates. Like Mullen et al. (2001), we adopt a simple constant price elasticity form. In order to 
lighten the comparative statics, we assume that the price of other variable inputs is fixed. This 
assumption will be relaxed in the simulations sections. 
 
2. The optimal supply and demand functions 
Formally the farm household’s program is thus written as follows:    5 
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With  p ~   the  current  profit,  r     the  risk  aversion  coefficient  (assumed  different  from  1), 
s a a , , 0 I  the CES function parameters and  1 < q  the returns to scale coefficient. Maximising 
the expected utility is equivalent to maximising the certainty equivalent of the final wealth 
defined as the expectation of the final wealth less the risk premium:  
( ) ( ) ( ) p p p ~ ~ max ~ max 0 0 0 + - + = Û + W PR W E EC W EU         (2) 
Arrow and Pratt (1964) showed through Taylor developments that this risk premium could be 
approximated by: 
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According to our assumptions on the sources of risk and the form of the utility function this 
risk premium can be approximated by: 
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It is not possible to obtain an analytical solution neither for these optimal demands nor for the 
product  supply.  However  it  will  be  easier  to  analyse  the  effects  of  farm  programs  by 
decomposing this program in two steps. The first step consists in minimising the production 
costs for a given production quantity. The second step consists in maximising the certainty 
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Solutions of this first step are:    6 
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Equations (7) mainly show that the ratio of variable inputs does not depend on the direct 
payment. The impact strictly passes through the production quantity effect. This quantity is 
solution of the second step program:  
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The optimal production quantity is thus implicitly determined by the first order condition
3: 
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3. Comparative statics 
Equations (7) and (9) define the behaviour of the farm household. We complete the system 
with the specification of the land supply function:  
T R T T
e b . =                       (11) 
First differentiation of these equations allows us to identify the impact on production and land 
rental  rates  of  direct  payments  and  of  an  output  subsidy  (which  is  equivalent  in  this 
framework to an increase of the expected price):  
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With   7 
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 is the share of the other variable inputs in total variable expenditures.  
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And thus the denominator expression D is always positive. Consequently an increase in the 
direct payment increases the production (equation 12). As expected it appears that there is no 
effect when the relative risk aversion coefficient is null. On the contrary the impact of an 
output subsidy on production is always positive even if the relative risk aversion coefficient is 
null (equation 13). Finally both farm programs increase the land rental rates (equation 14). It 
is  more  interesting  to  compare  the  effects  of  these  two  instruments  for  a  given  public 
expenditure and starting from a no support situation (
Y P Y DP m ¶ = ¶ . ). The relative impact on 
production is thus given by:  
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We thus find the standard result that, for a given public expenditure, an output subsidy has a 
higher  production  impact  than  a  direct  payment.  But  this  first  framework  also  implies 
(equation 14) that this output subsidy has a higher impact on land rental rates than a direct 
payment. This is so because the latter is assumed to be kept by the farm producer for the 
remuneration  of  the  fixed  human  capital.  Landowners  thus  do  not  benefit  from  direct 
payments, a result which is in contradiction with many empirical studies (Bhaskar and Beghin 
2007b).  
 
2. Explaining farm wealth and identifying the final beneficiary of direct payments  
1. Farm household’s wealth and land values: a cursory literature review 
In all studies on the decoupling of  agricultural farm programs, the initial wealth of farm 
households is assumed to be fixed. According the United States Department of Agriculture 
(Mishra et al. 2002), this wealth is mainly constituted by the value of the agricultural land that 
they  own.  Moreover  agricultural  land  is  mainly  owned  by  farm  households.  Then  it  is 
important to clearly understand the formation of land values. In that respect, many theoretical 
and empirical works have tried to explain the land (rental/selling) price. They all show that 
agricultural profits and farm programs positively influence this price. They also show that the 
agricultural land is a particular asset because the income expectation is lower than for other 
assets  and  the  income  variability  is  simultaneously  higher  (Erickson  et  al.  2004).  This 
suggests that asset markets are segmented. Chavas and Thomas (1999) showed the importance 
of transaction costs on the buying/selling of agricultural land, the nature of inter-temporal 
preferences of investors and their attitude toward risk allow explaining this particularity. In   8 
other words the agricultural land asset is not directly substitutable to other assets and farm 
households are the more affected by a modification of the value of this asset. Regarding the 
distribution  of  direct  payments  between  farmers  and  land  owners,  both  US  and  EU  farm 
producers get these direct payments only under some conditions. In particular they must have 
some  eligible  land  (base  acreage  in  the  US,  reference  acreage  in  the  EU).  These  direct 
payments are in fact defined as the product of a fixed amount per acre/hectare unit (dp) and a 
historical acreage ( H T ). Accordingly these producers must farm this acreage to get the direct 
payments.  If  the  producer  is  purely  a  renter,  then  he  may  not  perceive  at  all  the  direct 
payments due to increased rental rates. That depends on the farm land regulations. In the US 
case that we will  refer  to in the simulation section, renters cannot acquire base  and thus 
always pay the full costs of program benefits to the land owner (Duffy et al. 1994).  
In  sum,  the  wealth  of  a  farm  household  is  mainly  composed  of  the  land  asset  and  farm 
programs have a significant impact on the land values. So it seems appropriate to introduce 
these two characteristics in the conceptual framework. 
 
2. Our conceptual framework 
In order to include these two characteristics, it is useful to distinguish the farm producer, the 
farm household and the landowner. Suppose first the extreme case of a producer renting all 
his  land  and  whose  wealth  is  in  terms  of  non  agricultural  asset  (denoted  WNF ).  His 
landowner knows that he needs the land to get the direct payments and can thus increase the 
rent in order to collect the benefits of subsidies (Duffy et al. 1994). This is in fact one of the 
most  important  criticisms  against  the  direct  payments  system  (Goodwin  et  al.  2005  for 
instance).  The  wealth  effect  of  direct  payments  is  null  for  such  a  producer  because  his 
program is given by:  
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In this program, the direct payment no longer appears and thus has no direct impacts on the 
production level of this farm. From this program, it must also be clear that there are two rental 
prices of land: the level  R  on the acreages non eligible to direct payments and  dp R +  on the 
others. Even this producer does not change his behaviour due to the introduction of direct 
payments, the average land rental price increases with this direct payment.  
Let’s turn now to the more realistic case of a farm household who partially owns his land. 
Land in property is furthermore supposed to be lower than historical land eligible to direct 
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Where  P T  is the quantity of land owned by the household, and  dp R t t ,  the actualisation rates 
applied respectively to the land rental price and the direct payment. The wealth of this farm   9 
household thus depends on the non agricultural assets (assumed fixed in this analysis) and the 
total value of land in property. Like Lamb and Henderson (2000) for instance, we assume that 
the land value depends on its rental price and on the unitary direct payment. The expression of 
wealth is obviously simplified because it does not explicitly include any risky components for 
non  agricultural  assets  neither  for  land.  They  are  however  implicitly  in  the  different 
actualisation rates of the three components of wealth. The maximisation program of this farm 
household is given by:  
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The direct payment enters the maximisation program only through the explanation of the 
initial wealth. On the contrary it does no longer appear in the current expected profit because 
we assume a perfect land market. Accordingly this farm household has the possibility to rent 
out his land eligible to direct payment.  
First order conditions of the new program for an interior solution are very similar to the 
standard ones (equations 7 and 9).  The implicit equation defining the optimal supply has the 
same structure. Just the expression of final wealth is modified:   
( ) ( )















, , . .
0




























s r s r
m
          (19) 
 
3. The comparative statics 
In order to analyse the effects of an output subsidy and of a direct payment, we assume that 
the latter occurs through a change of the unitary direct payment (this will ease comparison for 
an equal budgetary cost). Total differentiation of equations (7), (11) and (19) leads to:  
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With   10 
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The impact on the rental price of land is still given by equation (14). The sign of the new 
denominator  can  not  be  determined  without  ambiguity.  If  negative,  this  implies  that  the 
optimal supply of our farm household increases with the land rental price. This possibility can 
not be ruled out in theory and the economic interpretation is as follows. On a one hand, an 
increase of the rental price of land increases the production cost of the farm producer and thus 
reduce the production incentive. On a second hand, an increase of the rental price of land 
increases the wealth of farm household, which in turn stimulates production of a risk averse 
agent. With standard values of behavioural parameters (elasticity of land supply, substitution 
elasticities  and  values  of  final  wealth),  this  possibility  does  not  appear  empirically. 
Disregarding this case, the impacts of an output subsidy and a direct payment on production 
and land rental rates remain positive. The comparison with former impacts (equation 12, 13) 
is not immediate because the denominators are not strictly the same. We can nevertheless 
remark  that  the  production  impact  of  direct  payment  may  be  greater  than  previously 
recognized, especially if the actualisation rate of direct payment is low. We can also remark 
that the two denominators are the same if the land supply elasticity is infinite. In this case, it is 
readily apparent that the direct payment has now a larger impact on the production by an 
amount equal to the inverse of the actualisation rate. On the other hand, the production impact 
of output subsidies remains the same.  
For a same budgetary cost and starting from a situation without farm programs, the relative 





























































   (22) 
Assuming that the denominator is always positive, this last expression shows that it is still 
impossible  to  determine  the  relative  production  impact  of  direct  payments  and  output 
subsidies. Again, if the actualisation rate of direct payments is low, it can not be ruled out that 
direct  payments  have  a  greater  production  impact  than  equal  cost  output  subsidies.  By 
extension, their impact on the rental price of land non eligible to payment may be greater. 
Finally their impact on the average rental price of land may be much greater too.   
In  sum  the  explanation  of  the  wealth  of  farm  households  can  theoretically  increase  the 
coupling  effects  of  different  agricultural  policy  instruments.  Even  if  it  is  not  possible  to 
compare these increased coupling effects in all cases, we show in a simple case that this is 
more likely for direct payments than for output subsidies. Simultaneously we clearly identify 
in our conceptual framework the ultimate beneficiary of direct payments. Contrary to current 
analyses, we thus acknowledge the capitalisation of farm support in land values. How these 
modifications impact the different results is an empirical matter, to which we turn now. 
 
3. Calibration of an empirical model  
The conceptual framework described herein is obviously very simplified compared to the 
reality of farm households who realize several productions (and not only one) using several   11 
inputs (and not only three) and facing several sources of risk (and not only the price risk). 
However our main objective in this article is to identify the influence of wealth actualisation 
in  the  estimation  of  the  decoupling  degree  farm  programs.  So  we  can  still  apply  this 
framework to a representative US farm producing corn only. The model parameters are first 
obtained  from  the  USDA  publication  on  the  characteristics  and  production  costs  of  corn 
specialized farms in 2001 (Foreman 2006, tables 1 and 3). We use the average production 
costs given in these tables. We thus assume the existence of a domestic farm of 670 acres. The 
representative farm household owns 60% of his initial area. 146 bushels per acre are produced 
and are valued 2 dollars per bushel (6% of which come from the loan deficiency payment 
program). The operational costs are 172 dollars per acre and the opportunity cost of land is 86 
dollars  per  acre.  The  household’s  profit  (remunerating  his  human  capital  and  the  risk 
premium) is thus 34 dollars per acre excluding direct payments. According to the OECD (ESP 
database), direct payments for corn in 2001 amount to 3802 million dollars and 75 million 
acres  were  allocated  to  corn.  Accordingly  the  direct  payments  represent  50  dollars  per 
cultivated acre. The base area is however at the most equal to 85% of the cultivated area and 
we thus assume that this direct support is paid on only 85 % of the area. The support is then 
equal to 58.8 dollars per eligible acre. 
Concerning the initial wealth of the household, the initial net value of the farm is equal to 383 
thousands  dollars.  At  the  macroeconomic  level  the  land  value  represents  80%  of  the 
agricultural assets. This farm owns 60% of its land, so the agricultural land is valued 1560 
dollars per acre. This value is lower than the agricultural land value of the states in the Corn 
Belt (the value reaches 2000 dollars per acre in Iowa and Illinois for instance) but largely 
higher than the agricultural land value at the national level (1100 dollars per acre). We thus 
adopt this value in the calibration of the model.  
We also have to calibrate the non agricultural assets owned by the household. According to 
Mishra et al. (2002), 69% of the net wealth of farm households is made of agricultural assets. 
Yet this proportion reaches 90% for the farms making positive profits (that are the farms 
realising most of the agricultural productions). As the farm we model initially makes profit, 
we assume that only 10% of the initial net wealth includes non agricultural assets. The value 
of non agricultural assets is then 87 thousands dollars and the total net wealth 870 thousands 
dollars.  
To determine the value of elasticities we use the summary of Abler (2001). The substitution 
elasticity between land and variable inputs is thus fixed at 0.4, the land supply elasticity at 0.1 
and finally the other input aggregate (capital and intermediate consumptions) supply elasticity 
at 1 (we introduce a supply function similar to the land one, as this is done in Mullen et al. 
2001). We use the econometric estimations of Mullen et al. (2001) and Moledina et al. (2004) 
to calibrate the coefficient of variation of corn price at 0.2 (that is a variance of 0.16). Like 
authors (Lamb and Anderson 2000) we assume the same actualisation rate in the initial wealth 
formula (7.4%). The underlying assumption is that the uncertainty concerning the durability 
of direct payments is discounted in the same manner by the farm household as the uncertainty 
of the market returns.  
It just remains one parameter to completely calibrate the model. We can either fix the initial 
level of relative risk aversion or fix the level of returns to scale. Indeed these to parameters 
are  linked  in  equation  (9)  which  implicitly  defines  the  production  level.  Here  we  fix  the 
relative risk aversion coefficient at 5, this implies returns to scale of 0.92. In other words 8% 
of the production value is used to pay the fix factor and the risk premium is initially 4132 
dollars that is 2.1% of the production value.  
   12 
4. Illustrative simulations 
In  this  fourth  section  we  present  simulations  in  order  to  illustrate  the  importance  of  our 
modifications. We thus simulate the impact of removing direct payments according to the two 
conceptual  frameworks.  We  also  simulate  the  removal  of  a  hypothetical  output  subsidy 
leading to the same static effect on farm revenue. Practically we reduce the expected price by 
17%. Results are reported in Table 1.  
In the first row we report the effects of a 1% expected price decrease, so as to compute the 
price  elasticity  and  further  legitimate  our  calibration  choices.  It  is  well  known  that  in  a 
deterministic framework the price elasticity of the product depends on the price elasticities of 
the factors supply and on the substitution between factors in the production technology (see 
for instance, Hertel 1989). The producer’s profit is then used to pay the fixed factor invested 
in the activity by the household if this factor is unique. In addition, when the risk aversion is 
introduced, this elasticity depends on the repartition of profit between the risk premium of the 
household  (which  is  sensitive  to  price)  and  this  (residual)  income  of  fixed  factor. 
Consequently the price elasticity of production is more important when the risk aversion is 
taken into account. The estimated elasticities are 0.4 without risk aversion and 0.44 with risk 
aversion. These values are consistent with the elasticities estimated by the USDA (Lin et al. 
2000), which confirm our choices for the different parameters.  
With the standard modelling of risk averse farmers, (second row of table 1), the suppression 
of direct payments leads to a very limited decrease in production (0.067%). The main effects 
are a reduction of the farm household’s profit (59%) and a slight decrease in his final wealth 
(3.58%). The wealth elasticity of production is thus very low (0.029) which is common in 
econometric estimations (Serra et al. 2006). Still under the same assumption, the removal of 
the hypothetical output subsidy (leading to the same static effect on the farm total revenue) 
leads to an 8% decrease in production (ex post elasticity of 0.47). The production impact is 
thus much larger by a factor of 119.  This ratio is not unrealistic; OECD (2004) for instance 
estimated the effect of on a marginal output subsidy of one dollar 66 times higher than the 
effect of a marginal direct payment of one dollar. Our estimation is thus higher in spite of a 
higher relative risk aversion coefficient (5 instead of 2). The difference in production ratio can 
be  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  OECD’s  analysis  assumes  that  the  household’s  wealth 
include  the  off-farm  revenues  only.  In  other  words  the  initial  wealth  is  relatively  low 
compared to the farm household’s profit. We can reproduce this ratio (66) with relative risk 
aversion coefficient of 2 by assuming that the initial wealth of our representative farmer is 
57% lower. This result reinforces our main idea to correctly measure the initial wealth of farm 
households. This idea is reinforced again by the analysis of the consequences of these two 
instruments on the rental price of land. The production subsidy instrument has a noted effect 
on this price (28% decrease) whereas the direct payment effect is nearly null (0.27%). This 
contradicts the great majority of economic studies which conclude that this support is strongly 
capitalized in land.   
When we use our conceptual framework (third row of table 1) then the production effect of 
direct payments is not negligible anymore (1.2%). This can be explained by the fact that the 
(initial or final) wealth of the farm household is now seriously decreased –more than 37%). 
The  wealth  elasticity  of  production  is  still  low  (0.03)  and  consistent  with  econometric 
estimates. The effect of a reduction of the price expectation is reinforces too but less than 
previously (8.4% instead of 8%) because here again the initial (and final) wealth decreases 
more. The strongest result concerns the production effects ratio: it is now 7.5 instead of 119 
previously. 
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5. Simulations of the effects of the US corn policy 
The previous simulations allow appreciating the need to actualise the initial wealth to measure 
the effects of direct payments. We now measure the effects of the US corn policy applied in 
2001,  first  using  the  standard  framework  where  the  initial  wealth  is  fixed  and  the  final 
beneficiary of the support is not clearly identified, second when the initial wealth is actualised  
and direct payments are capitalized in land values. This simulation assumes the suppression of 
direct payments, a 6% decrease in the product price expectation. This is the initial amount of 
output subsidy reported in the OECD PSE database (the underlying assumption is that the 
producer is a small producer on the world market). We also assume a 70% increase of the 
variance  of  the  price  received  by  the  producer  following  the  suppression  of  the  loan 
deficiency  payment  (from  Mullen  et  al.  2001).  These  three  shocks  (direct  payments, 
expectation  and  variance  of  price)  are  applied  individually  and  then  simultaneously  to 
appreciate the cumulative effect of the different instruments. This simulation of the effects of 
the US corn policy is obviously only illustrative because we do not take into account the 
effects  of  the  policies  applied  to  the  other  sectors.  Again  this  does  not  prevent  us  from 
identifying the importance of a correct measurement of wealth in this simplified simulation. 
The results are presented in table 2. With the traditional modelling the suppression of the US 
corn policy leads to a 4.1% decrease of production. This decrease is essentially (66%) due to 
the reduction of price expectation and to a lesser extent (31%) to the increase in price variance 
(same proportions as in OECD, 2004). Unsurprisingly the effect of direct payments which 
only passes through the wealth effect is very low (2%). The total effect almost corresponds to 
the effect of each instrument.  
When we actualise wealth and recognize the capitalisation of the direct payments in land 
values, then the suppression of the US corn policy leads to a 6.84% decrease in production 
which is a 68% more important effect. Furthermore the effect of the price support (via the 
decrease in expectation and the increase in variance) is relatively marginally modified (4.3% 
instead of 4%). On the contrary the effect of the direct payment is now clearly more important 
(1.1%) and finally the effects of instruments are not simply cumulative anymore. The total 
effect is not equal to the sum of effects. This comes from the non linearity induced by the 
wealth effect.  
 
Conclusion 
The recent agricultural policies reforms in developed countries introduced direct payments to 
the  detriment  of  traditional  instruments  enhancing  production.  Several  channels  through 
which these new instruments can impact production have been identified.  Particularly these 
direct payments increase farm households’ wealth, which reduce the risk premium of the risk 
averse households. However available studies estimate that this effect is empirically low. In 
this article, we have revisited this measurement of the coupling effect through wealth for risk 
averse farm households. Indeed their initial wealth is always assumed to be fixed whereas it is 
essentially determined by the agricultural land value. So we have theoretically and empirically 
demonstrated that the actualisation of the initial wealth to the evolution of the agricultural 
policy considerably modify the measurement of the coupling effect of direct supports and 
more marginally of traditional instruments. A simulation of the suppression of the US corn 
policy illustrates the importance of this actualisation. The coupling effect of the US policy on 
corn production is underestimated by 68% when the wealth is not actualised.  
From a political point of view these results imply that the support instruments classified in the 
green box can really impact the production. The integration of this work in some more global   14 
analysis of agricultural policies is obviously a useful continuation to be considered. It would 
as well be useful to understand why simultaneously the agricultural land is mainly owned by 
farm households and their wealth is mainly in the agricultural land asset. Is it simply the 
consequence of the farmers’ particular preferences? Or, on the contrary, does it result from 
some land regulation or tax policies which are in favour of farmers? If this is the case, our 
results  suggest  that  it  is  important  to  consider  simultaneously  the  direct  and  indirect 
agricultural income support policies.    
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Table 1. Impacts of the suppression of direct payments and of output subsidies according to the conceptual frameworks (in % related to 
the initial situation)  
 

















No risk aversion, price = -1% 
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Proposed modelling with actualised initial wealth and capitalisation of direct payments in land values 
 
Initial value  97820 bushels  670 acres  86$/acre  115240 
(index) 
22780$  870000 $  892780 $ 
 
Suppression of direct payment 
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 Table 2. Impacts of the suppression of the US corn policy in 2001 according to the conceptual frameworks (in % related to the initial 
situation) 
 

















Standard modelling with fixed initial wealth and lump sum direct payments 
 
Initial value  97820 bushel  670 acres  86$/acre  115240 
(index) 
56280$  870000 $  926280 $ 
 
6% decrease of price expectation  
70% increase of price variance 






































Proposed modelling with actualised initial wealth and capitalisation of direct payments in land values 
 
Initial value  97820 
bushel 
670 acres  86$/acre  115240 
(index) 
22780$  870000 $  892780 $ 
 
6% decrease of price expectation (i) 
70% increase of price variance (ii) 
Suppression of direct payment 
Total 
Total (i) + (ii) 
 
-2,79 
-1,39 
-1,11 
-6,84 
-4,31 
 
-1,12 
-0,56 
-0,44 
-2,76 
-1,73 
 
-10,64 
-5,41 
-4,35 
-24,37 
-16,00 
 
-3,94 
-1,97 
-1,58 
-9,50 
-6,04 
 
-5,59 
22,80 
18,36 
51,68 
17,08 
 
-5,69 
-2,89 
-38,88 
-49,58 
-8,55 
 
-5,69 
-2,24 
-37,42 
-47,00 
-7,90 
 
 